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Selection-based 
Learning: The 
Coevolution of Internal 
and External Selection 
in High-velocity 
Environments 
Andrew D. Henderson 
Ithai Stern 
University of Texas at Austin 
To understand the effects of selection on firm-level learn- 
ing, this study synthesizes two contrasting views of evo- 
lution. Internal selection theorists view managers in mul- 
tiproduct firms as the primary agents of evolutionary 
change because they decide whether individual products 
and technologies are retained or eliminated. In contrast, 
external selection theorists contend that the environment 
drives evolution because it determines whether entire 
firms live or die. Though these theories differ, they 
describe tightly interwoven processes. In assessing the 
coevolution of internal and external selection among per- 
sonal computer manufacturers across a 20-year period, 
we found that (1) firms learned cumulatively and adap- 
tively from internal and partial external selection, the lat- 
ter occurring when the environment killed part but not all 
of a firm; (2) internal and partial external selection co- 
evolved, as each affected the other's future rate and the 
odds of firm failure; (3) partial external selection had a 
greater effect on future outcomes than internal selection; 
and (4) the lessons gleaned from prior selection were 
reflected in a firm's ability to develop new products, 
making that an important mediator between past and 
future selection events.0 
Theories of evolutionary change deal with variation, selection, 
and retention (Aldrich, 1999), yet scholars differ as to 
whether management or the environment is the primary dri- 
ver of those processes. Research on technological change 
has detailed how scientific breakthroughs set off periods of 
ferment (variation), followed by eras when industries sift 
through technical alternatives and converge on a dominant 
design (selection) and then by long periods of incremental 
change, in which a few players come to dominate (retention) 
(Schumpeter, 1942; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Dosi, 
1988). Similarly, organizational ecologists argue that startups 
are the primary source of new organizational forms (varia- 
tion). After their birth, various forms compete for resources 
as the environment culls out misfits (selection) until, finally, 
survivors' routines closely match the demands of their cho- 
sen niche (retention) (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Carroll and 
Hannan, 2000). Because the ecology and technological 
change literatures emphasize how the environment picks the 
firms that survive and fail, they embody theories of external 
selection. Such theories view established firms as bundles of 
routines that evolve incrementally along smooth trajectories 
in which small organizational changes are possible, but major 
departures are rare and increase the odds of failure. Accord- 
ing to this view, (a) novel technologies and organizational 
designs arise chiefly from new firms; (b) old technologies and 
organizational forms disappear because established firms fail; 
and (c) established firms may adapt to a single, large environ- 
mental jolt (Haveman, 1992, 1993), but long-term survival is 
doubtful in high-velocity settings that continually render exist- 
ing skills obsolete (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Amburgey, 
Kelly, and Barnett, 1993; Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994; 
Dobrev, Kim, and Hannan, 2001). External selectionists con- 
clude, then, that the environment is the primary evolutionary 
agent, because managers in established firms mostly react to 
its moves, often maladaptively. 
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In contrast, other research has described internal selection 
processes in established multiproduct firms, in which front- 
line managers and employees propose numerous initiatives 
(variation), which then compete for corporate resources and 
top management attention (selection) until a few surviving 
projects remain that receive substantial backing (retention) 
(Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983, 1991, 2002; Noda and 
Bower, 1996). Internal selection is distinct from wholesale 
changes in a firm's core activity or form, such as switches in 
the formats of radio stations (Greve, 1998) or movements 
along fitness landscapes (Levinthal, 1997), which affect all of 
a firm's outputs by altering the pipeline of processes that 
every product must traverse. Rather, internal selection theory 
allows that a firm may be internally diverse, with a portfolio 
of projects and technologies that arise through bottom-up ini- 
tiatives. Managers are seen as the primary evolutionary 
agents because they frequently anticipate the environment's 
moves and adjust, often well before a firm's current 
approaches have stopped working. Even in old, well-estab- 
lished companies, front-line supervisors can proactively sug- 
gest a wide variety of new projects, and by shifting 
resources to new projects from less promising ones, execu- 
tives can alter their firms either slightly or radically. Not all 
such moves are adaptive, since internal politics skew 
resource allocations, nor do they reflect rational planning, 
since internal variations include bootlegged projects that arise 
without top managers' approval (Burgelman, 1994). Never- 
theless, bottom-up roposals enhance internal variety and 
allow experimentation, so they are seen as a powerful means 
of renewing established firms and mitigating threats posed 
by dramatic external change (Burgelman, 1983, 1991; Miner, 
1990, 1991). 
As this discussion suggests, the internal and external selec- 
tion literatures are largely disjoint in their theory and pro- 
posed effects. That is troubling, since organizational learning 
links the internal and external realms, especially in high-veloc- 
ity settings in which a firm can quickly develop new products 
and technological variations. Learning is a cumulative process 
in which elements of prior experience are retained that lead 
to systematic changes in future behavior (Levitt and March, 
1988; Miner and Haunschild, 1995). That may occur, for 
instance, through a series of internal selection events, in 
which a firm tries out several products and then jettisons 
those whose technologies appear less promising, thus reduc- 
ing the threat of environmental selection. Also, while external 
selection has been equated with an organization's death, a 
firm may survive even though the environment kills some of 
its products, as happened with the Ford Edsel, the IBM PC 
Jr., and Coca Cola's New Coke. Because environmental 
selection need not equate with organizational failure, it is 
important to ask if the death of some of a firm's products 
prods it to learn about its environment in ways that affect its 
future decisions about internal selection. 
To date, research on internal selection has focused on large, 
diversified, and relatively successful firms, which begs the 
question of how they attained that status and whether small- 
er and less successful organizations behave differently. Aside 
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Selection-based Learning 
from Miner's (1990, 1991) study of the internal selection 
rates of idiosyncratic jobs in a single large organization, inter- 
nal selection research is based almost entirely on case stud- 
ies, so the number of specific hypotheses formulated and 
systematically tested is quite small. Typically, those case 
studies have covered a narrow slice of time relative to the 
phenomena of interest. For example, Burgelman (1983) 
observed several projects across a 15-month period, yet he 
noted that project life cycles often exceed a decade. Thus 
we can conclude little about the long-term coevolution of 
firms and the projects within them. By considering bottom-up 
managerial initiatives and internal selection decisions along 
with the external selection environment over time, we stand 
to gain a better understanding of how firms evolve and why 
they differ in their abilities to cope with fast-paced external 
change. 
While ecologists, learning theorists, and technology scholars 
have amassed an impressive body of research (Baum, 1996; 
Carroll and Hannan, 2000), none of those studies has consid- 
ered how internal and external selection might coevolve and 
influence one another, particularly in high-velocity environ- 
ments, which are defined by rapid and often discontinuous 
changes in demand, competitors, and technology (Eisenhardt 
and Bourgeois, 1988). In such settings, firms experience 
selection events frequently and repeatedly as innovation ren- 
ders older technologies obsolete. Selection events are a 
potential engine of organizational earning because they trig- 
ger repeated trial-and-error searches, and the lessons derived 
from prior investigations can gradually accumulate and guide 
future actions. Our empirical setting, the personal computer 
(PC) industry from 1975 to 1994 is a prototypical high-velocity 
environment that has witnessed many abrupt changes in 
technologies and competitors, resulting in rapid shifts in 
demand for existing products (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
To examine how internal and external selection may influence 
one another, we focus on three product-level events, which 
for our purposes, are mutually exclusive: (1) internal selec- 
tion, in which a firm's managers proactively remove a product 
from the market before it becomes obsolete, an act that 
frees resources to develop new technologies; (2) partial 
external selection, in which the environment kills a product 
but leaves its host firm alive; and (3) full external selection, in 
which a product dies because the environment kills the entire 
organization in which it resides. We consider what a firm may 
learn about changes in technology and customer demands 
from the non-fatal product-level selection events in its past 
and develop hypotheses about how such learning drives 
future evolution. 
COEVOLUTION OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
SELECTION 
Qualitative case studies of resource allocation processes 
form the backbone of research on internal selection (Bower, 
1970; Burgelman, 1983, 1991, 1994; Noda and Bower, 1996). 
That work details a bottom-up, emergent process of organiza- 
tional change in which front-line, mid-level, and top managers 
play distinct but interlocking roles. Front-line managers, who 
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are close to the market and understand key technologies, 
function as entrepreneurs who create strategic initiatives by 
proposing new products and ways to reach new customers. 
From these proposals, mid-level managers endorse chosen 
ones and broker deals with top executives and other mid- 
level managers to obtain the resources needed to pursue 
them. Since mid-level managers put their careers and reputa- 
tions on the line with these proposals, they scrutinize them 
heavily before backing them. In comparison, top executives 
usually lack the knowledge to assess a project's economic 
and technical merits, so they focus on the credibility and 
track records of the sponsoring middle managers and seldom 
reject their recommendations. 
To select among competing projects, middle managers must 
forecast future shifts in technology, competition, and cus- 
tomer demand. Since they are boundedly rational, managers' 
internal selection decisions are often flawed, yet those fore- 
casts are typically a good deal better than random guesses, 
particularly in firms that can extrapolate from their experience 
and combine that information with real-time market feed- 
back. While managers often misjudge the long-range poten- 
tial of ideas that are still on the drawing board, technology 
evolves along quasi-predictable trajectories (Dosi, 1988), so 
firms can use their experience to interpret incoming market 
feedback and make moderately informed, forward-looking 
decisions about whether to kill or sustain existing offerings 
and whether to intensify the search for new technological 
variations. 
Forecasting plays little role in external selection theory, but it 
is a daily fact of life in most organizations. Publicly traded 
firms must forecast their earnings to Wall Street. Marketing 
managers must forecast consumer preferences to decide 
which products to stock. And R&D managers must look 
ahead to decide what products to develop. Such forecasting 
may work poorly in the face of disruptive technologies or rad- 
ical innovations, yet even in their midst, firms like IBM, 
Honda, and Hewlett-Packard have prospered due to bottom- 
up initiatives that have given them diverse technological port- 
folios from which to choose (Christensen, 1997), a process 
central to internal selection theory. While comparing the effi- 
cacy of forecasting and internal selection in eras of radical 
and non-radical change is beyond the scope of this study, 
their effects are important in both types of environments. 
While internal selection theory describes how processes of 
variation, selection, and retention transform existing firms, 
external selectionists maintain that (a) the durable nature of a 
firm's founding imprint constrains its future changes; (b) 
stakeholders demand reliability, so external selection favors 
inertial organizations that reproduce their actions despite 
environmental change; and (c) while some major changes 
might offer long-run benefits, technical and sociopolitical 
forces make them difficult to implement because they 
decrease near-term reliability (Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984; Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993). As 
a technology becomes established, incumbent firms develop 
deep structures and rigid paradigms that channel their rou- 
tines and information processing (Tushman and Anderson, 
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1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Sorensen and Stuart, 
2000). And while that process increases their competencies 
in existing technologies, it inhibits their ability to learn about 
and adapt to new ones. Established firms sometimes experi- 
ment and take risks (variation), but as they grow larger and 
older, such exploration is gradually driven out by exploitation 
(selection and retention), consisting of incremental refine- 
ments to the status quo (Cyert and March, 1963; March, 
1991; Levinthal and March, 1993). This evolutionary bias 
toward exploitation gradually reduces the internal variety of 
established firms, which limits their ability to cope with envi- 
ronmental change and makes them less likely than startups 
to create new technologies. Like the technical change and 
ecology literatures, the organizational earning literature there- 
fore concludes that young firms are the primary source of 
new ideas, and established firms with old ideas are the likely 
victims of environmental selection. As this discussion makes 
apparent, internal and external selectionists have contrasting 
ideas, the former viewing firms as loosely linked portfolios of 
multiple products and varied technologies, and the latter see- 
ing firms as monolithic, indivisible wholes. 
Internal selectionists think of firms as portfolios, and as 
Burgelman's (1994) case history of Intel's exit from the semi- 
conductor memory business demonstrated, no product is 
indispensable to an organization, even those believed to 
embody most the firm's core technology and social identity. 
Survival following such a business exit is possible because 
links among products are rather weak, as evidenced by the 
latitude that front-line managers have to pursue the technolo- 
gies, product features, production schedules, and markets 
they see fit (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983, 1994, 2002). 
Front-line managers function, then, as independent entrepre- 
neurs rather than cogs in an integrated corporate machine. 
Because their interactions are largely limited to drawing 
generic inputs from the same stockpile (e.g., cash, manufac- 
turing capacity), they typically face pooled interdependencies, 
which require minimal coordination, not sequential or recipro- 
cal ones that are harder to manage (Thompson, 1967). As a 
result, the death of one product has little operational effect 
on others, and each of a firm's offerings serves as an inter- 
changeable backup that helps to insure the survival of the 
larger organization. In comparison, external selection theo- 
rists view a firm as a monolithic whole. While they distin- 
guish between a firm's core and periphery (Singh, House, 
and Tucker, 1986), they assert that there is only one core per 
organization, and meddling with it tends to reset the liability- 
of-newness clock and increase the odds of failure 
(Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993; Hannan and Freeman, 
1984). While internal selectionists emphasize the autonomy 
and interchangeability of product-based technologies, exter- 
nal selectionists assert that a firm's core, and particularly its 
bundle of key technologies, forms an interlocking whole 
whose operation is rendered unreliable if any of its pieces are 
changed or replaced. 
These two views lead to different predictions about the envi- 
ronments to which a firm can adapt. In external selection the- 
ory, rapid environmental change is antithetical to survival, 
43/ASQ, March 2004 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 20:02:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
since a firm must either preserve its core and risk obsoles- 
cence or change its core frequently and risk the reliability of 
its operations. External selectionists are pessimistic, then, 
about organizational adaptation in high-velocity settings that 
continually render existing skills obsolete (Barron, West, and 
Hannan, 1994; Ranger-Moore, 1997). In comparison, internal 
selectionists observe that multiproduct firms can run on-line 
experiments and retain those that seem likely to improve 
external fit. Multiproduct firms are believed to be able to sur- 
vive and even flourish in a variety of environments, including 
fast-changing ones, because middle managers can support 
the internal variations that better match external demands at 
a given time (Burgelman, 1994). Although these views seem 
to conflict, key aspects of each can be reconciled by recon- 
sidering the concept of a firm's core and its relationship to 
the environment. 
According to internal selection theory, firms in high-velocity 
environments are usefully viewed as collections of products 
and development efforts, most of which are loosely linked. 
While each embodies variants of a firm's core technologies, 
any particular product can be selected out by either the envi- 
ronment or the firm's managers without killing the entire 
organization. The technological piece of an organization's core 
is better portrayed, then, as multipart and modular rather 
than monolithic. In contrast, external selection theory's view 
of firms as having a single, monolithic core coalesced from 
studies of newspapers and labor unions (e.g., Carroll, 1984, 
1985; Hannan and Freeman, 1987), and because those orga- 
nizations offered a single product, it was reasonable to view 
them as having an indivisible core. That, however, is less fit- 
ting in high-velocity settings in which opportunities for techni- 
cal differentiation abound, industry mythology glorifies inno- 
vation and bottom-up entrepreneurship, and products are 
developed in fast cycles so that even a single team, as it 
repeatedly amends its earlier choices, can create multiple 
offerings with varied technologies (Kidder, 1981; Florida and 
Kenney, 1990; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). An environment 
that encourages bottom-up innovation, technical variety, and 
loose coupling among products allows for selection events 
not accounted for in external selection theory. 
Selection Events in High-velocity Environments 
If firms are multipart and modular, then either a firm's man- 
agers or the environment might select out a product and its 
associated technologies, so living products are at risk of 
experiencing one of three mutually exclusive selection 
events. First, a firm's managers may decide to withdraw a 
product from the market, even though it is performing rea- 
sonably and remains viable in the current environment, an 
instance of internal selection. In that case, middle managers 
move proactively to free resources for other uses, such as 
developing new technologies, actions that internal selection- 
ists have emphasized (Bower, 1970; Miner, 1990, 1991; 
Burgelman, 1991, 1994). For example, Hewlett-Packard intro- 
duced two personal computers in its Vectra line in early 1991, 
with Intel 386 processors running at 16 and 20 MHz. By 
1992, their annual sales had increased 33 percent and 216 
percent, respectively, yet each was internally selected to 
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Selection-based Learning 
make way for five new Vectras based on Intel 486 proces- 
sors, running at 25 to 66 MHz. By 1993, each of those newer 
models had at least doubled its sales, yet all five were inter- 
nally selected to make room for the Pentium-based machines 
that HP had begun to deploy. 
Although eliminating a viable, revenue-producing product 
seems counterintuitive, it is quite common in high-velocity 
settings, in which obsolescence occurs quickly and once a 
new technology is introduced, demand for older versions 
plummets. In the PC industry, prices of older products often 
drop by 50 percent in the months after new technology 
supersedes them, so firms caught with obsolete inventory 
incur losses as market prices drop below production costs 
(Magretta, 1998). To see how this affects selection decisions, 
we interviewed several middle managers working in high- 
velocity industries. The response of one who worked for a 
PC manufacturer was representative. His goal, he said, was 
to kill a product before its sales had fallen 10 percent from 
their historical peak, because (1) larger decreases created 
enough unused production capacity to increase unit costs; (2) 
a single obsolete product could poison the image of an entire 
product line; and (3) suppliers had little desire to continue 
making components based on older technologies, so they 
would raise prices on items with declining demand to encour- 
age shifts to newer alternatives. Given the industry's narrow 
profit margins, any of those shifts, the manager reported, 
would generate losses if not preempted by internal selection. 
It usually took several months to clear a product's production 
and marketing pipelines, so internal selection required rea- 
sonably accurate forecasts of future demand. Those could 
easily be misjudged, but managers had clear incentives and 
intentions to make that sort of preemptive move. 
One might question whether internal selection includes 
events in which managers intentionally let products die slow 
deaths. That may be common in slow-moving industries, but 
it does not square with either Burgelman's (1994) account of 
the fast-paced semiconductor industry or comments by the 
middle managers from high-velocity industries that we inter- 
viewed, who stressed the costs of keeping outdated prod- 
ucts alive. One manager remarked that if a product's sales 
began to soften, he would increase marketing efforts and 
upgrade its features to prevent losing ground to competitors. 
He said that if sales fell more than 30 percent from their 
peak before a product exited the market, then the environ- 
ment had controlled its destiny, not him. In slower-paced 
industries, managers may intentionally let products linger, but 
in a high-velocity setting, when a product's sales drop sharply 
and it later dies, the environment is likely to have selected it 
out, not its managers. 
A second type of selection event occurs when the environ- 
ment removes a product by killing the firm it resides in, an 
instance of full external selection. That usually happens when 
most of a firm's products are struggling, yet it also includes 
cases in which a focal product is doing well but is eliminated 
when its host organization dies. Full external selection is 
therefore both a product-level and firm-level occurrence, so 
we consider both types of events. While studies of firm-level 
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failures are the norm in ecology, product-level analyses, 
which give greater weight to the exits of firms with more 
products, offer additional insights because failures contribute 
unequally to population-level change. Different products 
embody different ideas, so in terms of the rate at which the 
environment selects out variants, the death of a 20-product 
firm may be a bigger event than the demise of a two-product 
rival. Accordingly, our analyses of full external selection con- 
sider both product-level and firm-level outcomes. 
A third type of event, partial external selection, occurs when 
a firm survives, but the economic performance of the focal 
product is so poor that it is forced from the market. For 
example, consider Intel's exit from the dynamic random 
access memory (DRAM) market. According to Burgelman 
(1994), DRAMs accounted for over 90 percent of Intel's sales 
in the early 1970s, and the company had over 80 percent of 
world market share, but the emergence of Japanese com- 
petitors in the late 1970s led to a long slide so that by 1984, 
DRAMs accounted for only 5 percent of Intel's revenues, and 
its market share was only 1.3 percent. At that point, Intel 
exited the memory chip business, despite the long-held 
beliefs and stated intentions of its top executives, who con- 
tinued to view the firm as a memory company throughout its 
long decline. Here, the external environment clearly prevailed 
over Intel's executives and selected the company out of the 
DRAM segment. While Intel survived and eventually pros- 
pered, those products did not. As this illustrates, organiza- 
tional failure is not the only way that external selection 
occurs, and conversely, a firm's survival does not imply that 
the environment is not selecting out some of its internal vari- 
ations (Miner, 1991). To capture that, one must look at the 
life cycles of specific projects within firms. 
Figure 1 presents a typology of the three types of selection 
events and their outcomes. Managers and the environment 
may each play a role when a product dies in a firm that sur- 
vives, suggesting a blurred boundary between internal and 
partial external selection. We treat those as distinct, mutually 
exclusive outcomes, however, because they are quite differ- 
ent theoretically. Internal selection is proactive and explorato- 
Figure 1. Typology of selection event outcomes. 
Non-Event 
Possible Outcomes > Product survives 
and firm survives 
Internal Selection Partial External Full External 
Product is Selection Selection 
eliminated despite Product is Product is 
relatively strong eliminated due to eliminated because 
sales, and firm poor sales, and firm its host organization 
survives survives dies 
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Selection-based Learning 
ry, since managers use forecasts of future environmental 
demands to remove products that remain viable today and 
reallocate resources to develop new products aimed at future 
conditions. Managers therefore emphasize predictions rather 
than historical outcomes in making internal selection deci- 
sions. That is seen, for instance, in Hewlett Packard's deci- 
sion to kill its 1.3-inch Kittyhawk disk drive. After a slow start 
in 1992, its sales doubled in each of the next two years, yet 
it was internally selected because those revenues failed to 
meet HP's aggressive forecasts (Christensen, 1997). In com- 
parison, partial external selection is reactive and focused on 
the present, since managers, as in the case of Intel, continue 
to exploit existing products until the environment provides 
clear evidence that they are obsolete. Given the sharp dis- 
tinctions between exploration and exploitation (March, 1991), 
and between proactive moves based on forecasts and reac- 
tions to market outcomes (Miles and Snow, 1978; Zajac and 
Shortell, 1989), it is vital to distinguish between internal and 
partial external selection to discern their different effects on 
organizational earning. 
Selection-based Learning 
When firms respond to partial external selection or develop 
fresh ideas in anticipation of internal selection, they search 
for new solutions. Because firms must learn through trial and 
error to conduct effective searches, this creates a form of 
path-dependency that we call selection-based learning. 
Search comes in numerous forms, but we focus here on 
new product development, a vital mode of search in high- 
velocity settings, one that catalyzes organizational earning 
and creates relationships between past and future selection 
events. 
Selection-based learning and future selection rates. The 
phrase variation-selection-retention may be misleading when 
applied to internal selection because it suggests that once a 
variant is selected out, its influence is gone. Firms, though, 
can learn from prior selection events and store that knowl- 
edge in their routines, so the ghosts of dead products live on, 
creating a subtle form of retention. For example, numerous 
internal selections in a firm's past indicate that its managers 
have taken an active role in pruning products before they 
become obsolete deadwood that would bog down internal 
routines (cf. Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994). Also, by using 
internal selection to weed out less-than-satisfactory experi- 
ments with new technologies while discovering and retaining 
more valuable ones, a firm can implement a form of trial-and- 
error learning that does not place heroic demands on its top 
executives to bet the future on a narrow set of technologies 
(Miner, 1990, 1991; Burgelman, 1994). The cumulative 
amount of internal selection speaks, then, to how broadly a 
firm has searched for viable technologies and whether it has 
maintained its nimbleness by developing routines to prune its 
portfolio proactively of older variations. 
Internal selection offers benefits, yet it also creates chal- 
lenges. If a product is doing well, the firm can lose revenue if 
it is eliminated. Also, customers need time to understand the 
benefits of new technologies (Rogers, 1995), so middle man- 
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agers must consider whether a slow start by a novel offering 
constitutes a disappointing experiment that should be termi- 
nated or one with long-term potential that customers need 
more time to appreciate. Such choices are challenging in 
high-velocity settings because the simultaneous actions of 
numerous and shifting competitors make environmental 
feedback noisy and confusing (Eisenhardt, 1989; Levinthal 
and March, 1993). For example, demand for an existing prod- 
uct can fluctuate widely in the near term as rumors of new 
offerings temporarily freeze buyers. 
Because of this, internal selection decisions and the resource 
transfers they entail are far from easy, particularly if middle 
managers have little precedent to guide them. But firms that 
experience several such events across time can engage in 
trial-and-error learning and gradually hone their skills in antici- 
pating future demand shifts, moving personnel, and transfer- 
ring production capacity to new uses, knowledge that 
becomes embedded in the routines a firm uses to review its 
product portfolio, to gather competitive intelligence, and to 
reassign teams to new projects (cf. Bower, 1970; Wheel- 
wright and Clark, 1992). As firms accumulate experience with 
internal selection, they can better harness its benefits and 
overcome its challenges, reducing threats posed by the 
external environment. This suggests that the image of 
resilience and adaptability painted by internal selectionists is 
not an innate property of multiproduct firms but a condition 
that some evolve towards through experience. 
Hypothesis la (Hla): There will be a negative relationship between 
the cumulative number of internal selection events in a firm's past 
and its future rates of partial external selection. 
Hypothesis lb (Hlb): There will be a negative relationship between 
the cumulative number of internal selection events in a firm's past 
and its future rates of full external selection. 
At first glance, partial external selection, in which the environ- 
ment kills some of a firm's products, might seem to signal 
that failure is imminent because a company has overexploit- 
ed its older technologies. We expect, though, that partial 
selection provides dramatic and sometimes surprising feed- 
back that creates dissatisfaction with the status quo and 
prompts aggressive searches for new solutions. Given that 
managers in fast-paced industries have strong incentives to 
eliminate products before their sales decline too far, partial 
selection is often a negative surprise in which demand for a 
given technology disappears more quickly than managers had 
anticipated. Partial selection also includes cases in which 
firms invest in new technologies that the market subsequent- 
ly rejects, another negative surprise. While outcomes that 
conform with expectations tend to reinforce the status quo, 
negative surprises catalyze search and learning because they 
are salient, contradict established beliefs, and bring more 
diverse information into organizations than ordinary, pre- 
dictable outcomes (Buckley, 1967; March, Sproull, and 
Tamuz, 1991; Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). In addition, neg- 
ative surprises seldom meet a firm's aspirations, and the 
resulting gap between expected and actual outcomes drives 
organizational search and learning (Cyert and March, 1963; 
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Levinthal and March, 1993). Partial external selection there- 
fore serves as a dramatic and informative wakeup call that 
triggers search. Coca-Cola, for example, experienced such a 
wakeup call with New Coke. 
Following 20 years of market share losses to Pepsi, Coca- 
Cola announced in May 1985 that it was replacing its original 
formula with New Coke, a sweeter drink, similar to Pepsi. 
While New Coke's launch was based on $4 million in market 
research, 200,000 blind taste tests, and $10 million in adver- 
tising (Gilpin, 1985), it incited a storm of consumer com- 
plaints and such low sales that the firm was forced, just 
three months later, to remove New Coke and reintroduce its 
original formula. From this instance of partial external selec- 
tion, Coca-Cola's executives learned about the symbolic 
meaning of their product, its role in customers' emotional 
ties to the past, and how value stemmed from Coke's brand, 
not its formula. Those new beliefs, which were formed after 
careful reviews of the blunder, guided Coca-Cola's decision to 
revamp its marketing campaign around a new slogan, "Red, 
White and You," that emphasized Coke's all-American spirit. 
Such efforts gradually reversed Coke's market share losses 
to Pepsi, raised its stock price, and helped it recapture the 
confidence of its bottlers and customers (Harris and Hender- 
son, 1985; Pendergrast, 1993; Farrell and Comiteau, 1995). 
Coca-Cola learned a great deal from a single, spectacular 
instance of partial selection, yet partial selection events are 
often less dramatic, and a single small incident can be dis- 
missed as random variation that falls within normal operating 
bounds (March, Sproull, and Tamuz, 1991). More typically, 
learning from partial external selection accumulates gradually, 
particularly in high-velocity settings, in which firms must 
adapt by searching for innovations rather than simply reintro- 
ducing an established product, as Coca-Cola did. 
As Coca-Cola's recovery from the New Coke debacle sug- 
gests, firms that experience partial external selection will not 
abandon their existing routines completely, which would 
reset the liability-of-newness clock. Experienced firms cling 
to current arrangements, so partial selection will instead 
prompt them to retain existing activities and graft on new 
ones (cf. Huber, 1991) that they discover by searching areas 
that border their existing technologies and customers. That 
offers two benefits, particularly in fast-paced settings: (1) it 
breaks the self-reinforcing cycle that leads to over-exploita- 
tion of established routines (cf. March, 1991), and (2) new 
solutions are hybrids of new and old elements, and related 
diversification of that sort improves the odds of surviving 
external changes that render existing products obsolete 
(Haveman, 1992). In comparison, firms that seldom experi- 
ence partial selection by the environment may be lulled into a 
false sense of security in which change becomes infrequent 
and extremely incremental, a combination that can lead to 
obsolescence. Overall, this form of selection-based learning 
is likely to improve a firm's ability to avoid external selection 
in the future. 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): There will be a negative relationship between 
the cumulative number of partial external selection events in a firm's 
past and its future rates of partial external selection. 
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Hypothesis 2b (H2b): There will be a negative relationship between 
the cumulative number of partial external selection events in a firm's 
past and its future rates of full external selection. 
The cumulative number of selection events in a firm's past 
and its future rate of similar events are quite different, and 
hypotheses 2a and 2b reflect this. By definition, the cumula- 
tive number of partial selection events in a firm's past 
increases monotonically across time, and only after an event 
has occurred and then receded into the past does it add to 
that cumulative total. Increases in the knowledge embedded 
in a firm's cumulative partial selection experience should 
reduce the future odds of full external selection (H2b), result- 
ing in a relatively durable benefit. In contrast, while cumula- 
tive selection experience increases monotonically, future 
selection rates may either rise or fall depending on the influ- 
ences of various causal forces. Here, we predict that a firm's 
cumulative historical experience with partial external selec- 
tion will decrease the future rate of similar events (H2a). That 
process of self-suppression is consistent with evidence in 
the learning curve literature that the payoffs to experience 
accumulate, but at an ever slower rate as opportunities for 
learning are gradually depleted (Argote and Epple, 1990). 
Internal events driven by a firm's managers and partial selec- 
tion driven by the environment are likely to contribute differ- 
ently to selection-based learning. Specifically, partial external 
selection is apt to be the more beneficial of the two because 
it focuses attention on mismatches between organizational 
beliefs and market demands, while internal selection deci- 
sions are subject to the preferences of politically powerful 
managers. As evidenced by New Coke, partial selection 
prompts firms to question their understanding of links 
between a product's attributes and consumers' preferences. 
When an organization experiences a problem, it usually 
searches nearby for solutions (Cyert and March, 1963), so 
when the environment selects out part of a firm's portfolio, 
the firm will often respond by reassessing whether its exist- 
ing activities satisfy external demands. 
In comparison, internal selection decisions are colored more 
by organizational politics, since the projects that receive back- 
ing may not be those that best meet external demands but 
those whose internal champions are the most politically con- 
nected to top management (Bower, 1970; Miller, 1993). In 
firms with multiple product teams, the winners of prior inter- 
nal contests get funding and executive backing that establish- 
es their subgroup's influence. Once empowered, those sub- 
groups make investments, choose managers, and define the 
criteria that guide future decisions in ways that reinforce their 
standing (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981), an exam- 
ple of the Matthew effect (Merton, 1968; Podolny, 1994). 
Similarly, in firms with a single development team, there is 
always the question, "After we finish this product, what do 
we do next?" Because the future is uncertain, reasonable 
people often reach different conclusions about which direc- 
tion to take, resulting in political maneuvering among team 
members (Allison, 1969). While newer members may favor 
more radical departures, established leaders often prefer 
straightforward extensions of current products, since the 
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underlying technologies require their expertise (Miller, 1993; 
Serensen and Stuart, 2000). This narrowing of focus and 
power-begets-power process suggests that repeated 
instances of internal selection create dominant individuals 
and subgroups who then craft policies to limit changes that 
might threaten their control. As a result, internal selection 
may be less beneficial than partial external selection because 
the former creates dominant factions that are reluctant to 
eliminate the products and technologies that brought them to 
power, while the latter encourages firms to reassess their 
external fit, a vital task in fast-paced settings. 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The cumulative number of partial external 
selection events in a firm's past will decrease its future full external 
selection rates more than the same number of prior internal selec- 
tion events. 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The cumulative number of partial external 
selection events in a firm's past will decrease its future partial exter- 
nal selection rates more than the same number of prior internal 
selection events. 
To the extent that partial selection occurs in firms exposed to 
tough competition, it suggests "Red Queen" evolution, in 
which the survivors of strong rivalries adapt to become par- 
ticularly hardy (Barnett, Greve, and Park, 1994; Barnett and 
McKendrick, 2001). Prior work has not identified and mea- 
sured specific adaptive processes, however, as we do here, 
to ensure that organizational change and not survivor bias is 
driving empirical evidence of the Red Queen. One such adap- 
tive process involves a firm's tendency kill its own products 
before they become obsolete, acts of internal selection. 
We have argued that internal selection is cumulatively adap- 
tive, yet we also expect that organizational politics eventually 
constrain the benefits of such experience. An internal selec- 
tion decision not only terminates one project but also 
endows another with resources and a mandate to grow 
(Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983), so repeated instances 
either cement the power of existing subgroups or create 
powerful new ones and license them to build empires. 
Potent subgroups in growing empires try to fortify their influ- 
ence, so they become less likely, as their power accumu- 
lates, to kill the products that gave rise to their control, result- 
ing in less internal selection in the future and fewer 
opportunities to add to this form of knowledge. While internal 
selection is cumulatively adaptive, it is a self-braking process 
whose payoffs plateau, just as accumulating proprietary 
knowledge is self-braking, since firms with greater stocks of 
it search more narrowly and learn less from the environment 
(Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). Thus, we predict: 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): The cumulative number of internal selection 
events in a firm's past will decrease its future internal selection 
rates. 
Some organizational changes become routinized, so experi- 
enced firms are the ones most likely to repeat them (Grusky, 
1961; Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993). If internal selec- 
tion gathers a similar sort of positive momentum, that would 
contradict hypothesis 4a. But the pace of internal selection 
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speaks to how many technological variations a firm is explor- 
ing, and experienced firms increasingly cling to existing varia- 
tions rather than abandoning them (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984; March, 1991). Consequently, internal selection may 
decelerate with repetition rather than become more frequent. 
In sharp contrast to the self-braking tendency of internal 
selection, the surprise value of partial external selection and 
its challenge to established beliefs suggests that its capacity 
to fuel change will not decrease with repetition. As partial 
external selection recurs, a firm is less likely to view those 
events as so threatening that they induce rigidity and is more 
apt to treat them as small, manageable losses, outcomes 
that encourage firms to jettison old approaches and try new 
ones (Sitkin, 1992). Partial selection also reveals errors in 
managers' understanding of the external environment. When 
errors are rare, they seldom lead to meaningful change, since 
firms respond in simple-minded ways, such as blaming the 
person in charge. But as a firm experiences a wider variety of 
negative events, it is more likely to conduct deep analyses of 
the underlying causes, often leading to significant change 
(Miner et al., 1999; Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). Because 
internal selection involves significant changes in resource 
allocations, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): The cumulative number of partial external 
selection events in a firm's past will increase its future internal 
selection rates. 
Selection-based learning and future product introduc- 
tions. Selection-based learning catalyzes new product devel- 
opment, a vital means of searching for new technological 
variations. Many searches yield little, but experienced firms 
gradually discern how to generate more variations in a more 
timely manner, some of which are likely to be viable (Eisen- 
hardt and Tabrizi, 1995). When middle managers internally 
select otherwise viable offerings, replacements are needed 
to recoup lost revenues, so firms have strong incentives to 
launch new products to replace those that were selected out. 
Similarly, when partial external selection occurs, that negative 
feedback creates dissatisfaction with the status quo and trig- 
gers firms to search for new solutions. But while the desire 
to replace older products is pervasive, firms' ability to do so 
varies with their experience. 
Many products, including personal computers, are highly 
complex and composed of numerous interacting subsystems 
(processor, operating system, video adapter, etc.), so they are 
developed through iterative cycles of design, test, redesign, 
and retest as errors are discovered and corrected (Kidder, 
1981; Steffens, 1994). That trial-and-error discovery is time 
consuming, but with experience, development proceeds 
faster and more reliably because firms learn from their mis- 
takes and develop routines to support better approaches. 
This includes procedures to test early prototypes more rigor- 
ously, so errors are caught sooner and corrected well before 
full production begins, a time when change becomes both 
slow and expensive (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; Eisen- 
hardt and Tabrizi, 1995). Similarly, experience teaches firms 
to anticipate their customers' future requirements, decreas- 
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ing the need to change designs in mid-stream, which would 
delay new product launches. 
The number of selection events in a firm's past is an impor- 
tant measure of such experience because many things can- 
not be learned until an product's entire life has been 
observed, including reactions by customers and competitors 
to its introduction and evidence of subtle design and produc- 
tion flaws that come to light only after extensive use. As a 
firm sees how more of its technical variations have fared 
externally, product developers can use those data to reduce 
the uncertainty they face. This is essential in high-velocity 
environments, where uncertainty often freezes decision mak- 
ers and places them in vicious cycles in which they seek out 
data to confirm their initial choices, find that the environment 
has changed, and then restart their decision process (Eisen- 
hardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). In comparison, 
developers in firms that have experienced multiple product 
life cycles and selection events are likely to move more confi- 
dently, settle on a design, and introduce it quickly, rather than 
procrastinating for fear that a better choice is just over the 
horizon. 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): The cumulative number of internal selection 
events in a firm's past will increase its future rates of new product 
introduction. 
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): The cumulative number of partial external 
selection events in a firm's past will increase its future rates of new 
product introduction. 
While new product introduction entails certain risks (Dowell 
and Swaminathan, 2000; Barnett and Freeman, 2001), firms 
that produce more technological variations have better odds 
of discovering viable ones, a necessity for avoiding obsoles- 
cence and failure in fast-paced settings (Eisenhardt, 1989). If 
prior selection catalyzes product development, as hypotheses 
5a and 5b suggest, then that type of search will partially 
mediate the relationship between earlier selection events and 
the future likelihood of organizational failure. Thus, more prior 
selection events should lead to more product development, 
which in turn should lower the future odds of full external 
selection. Firms with extensive selection experience can 
introduce more new products per year because they have 
accrued knowledge in their routines about customer needs, 
product testing, competitive reactions, moving resources 
from older to newer projects, and forecasting technological 
change. Firms familiar with internal and partial external selec- 
tion are likely, then, to have strong abilities to introduce new 
products and the confidence to move quickly in the face of 
technological uncertainty. In turn, introducing more variants 
reduces the odds of failure because each new offering 
improves the chances of finding technologies that will fit 
emerging market demands. 
Hypothesis 6a (H6a): New product introductions will decrease 
future rates of full external selection. 
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Hypothesis 6b (H6b): New product introductions will partially medi- 
ate the effect of prior internal selection events on future rates of full 
external selection. 
Hypothesis 6c (H6c): New product introductions will partially medi- 
ate the effect of prior partial external selection events on future 
rates of full external selection. 
Figure 2 summarizes the hypothesized effects of selection 
events and shows that internal and external selection are 
interwoven phenomena. Managers use internal selection to 
prune deadwood and catalyze new product development, 
which affects the future odds of external selection. Con- 
versely, partial external selection serves as a wakeup call that 
moves firms away from the status quo by increasing their 
rates of internal selection and searches for new technological 
variations. 
Figure 2. Summary of hypothesized effects of selection events. 
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Cumulative internal Future partial 
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METHODOLOGY 
To test our ideas, we studied the population of firms in the 
U.S. personal computer industry from its founding in 1975 
through 1994. This industry includes manufacturers of micro- 
computers (e.g., the Apple Macintosh) and desktop and desk- 
side personal workstations (e.g., Sun Microsystems' SPARC- 
station). This industry is an appropriate one in which to test 
our theory because it is a prototypical high-velocity industry in 
which technologies, competitors, and product demand shift 
rapidly (Eisenhardt, 1989). Our data were drawn from a cen- 
sus listing, purchased from the International Data Corporation 
(IDC), of all domestic firms and foreign subsidiaries that built 
personal computers in the United States. IDC updated its list- 
ings annually and provided sales figures and some technical 
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information on all models of personal computers introduced 
during that time. In all, there were 736 firms and 6,727 prod- 
ucts. After lags in time-series data were accounted for, this 
yielded N = 11,707 product-years in the selection analyses 
and N = 2,709 firm-years in the product introduction and 
organizational failure rate models. 
Dependent Variables 
Selection events. Internal, partial external, and full external 
selection are mutually exclusive competing events, so three 
distinct variables tracked their rates. Whenever an event of 
one type took place (e.g., internal selection), the variables 
tracking the other two (e.g., partial and full external selection) 
were coded as right-censored (Allison, 1995). All three vari- 
ables were coded as right-censored in year t if the product 
survived, as evidenced by positive sales in year t+1, or if the 
product had positive sales in 1994, the final year of observa- 
tion. If, instead, a product had positive sales in year t and 
zero sales in all future ones, we coded a selection event and 
then identified its type. A full external selection event was 
coded when a focal product's host firm died, thus eliminating 
its entire portfolio. That happened in year t if each of a firm's 
products had zero sales in year t+1. Overall, there were 
1,289 full external selection events. As detailed later, we also 
assessed full external selection by estimating organizational 
failure rates. In those analyses, there were 576 failure 
events. 
Internal and partial external selection occurred only in surviv- 
ing firms, the former when managers removed a viable prod- 
uct from the market, and the latter when a product's sales 
had dropped so much that the market forced that product's 
death. To make that distinction, we had to identify a sales 
drop threshold, which we did by examining product lifecy- 
cles. The lives of PC products were often short, with a mean 
product age of 2.31 years (s.d. = 1.50) and a maximum 
observed life of 12 years. This is typical of high-velocity set- 
tings in which obsolescence is a constant threat (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Coupled with rapid industry growth (industry sales 
grew at a compound rate of 29.4 percent from 1975 to 
1994), this caused most products to exhibit one of two sales 
trajectories across their lives. One was an inverted V, in 
which sales quickly ramped up as demand for a new iteration 
of technology surged then quickly ramped down as that tech- 
nology became obsolete. Among such products, few ever 
reversed their downward slide after a substantial drop, say 
50 percent, from their peak. Because the market drove such 
products' deaths, that indicates partial external selection. The 
other typical trajectory, which signals internal selection, was 
simply the first half of that cycle-an upward ramp that 
ended with the product's being withdrawn from the market 
at its historical sales peak. Products in surviving firms tended, 
then, to exit on positive upswings or sharp downward slides. 
The histogram in figure 3 echoes this. We constructed it by 
examining the terminal year of all product exits in surviving 
firms, which constitutes the full sample of internal and partial 
external selection events. For each exit, we divided the prod- 
uct's sales in its terminal year by the peak annual sales it had 
achieved during its life. If a product exited at its historical 
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Figure 3. A product's terminal-year sales divided by its peak annual sales: Counts of observed values in 
surviving firms. 
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peak, then that ratio equaled 1; that ratio approached 0 if 
sales had fallen dramatically from their historical high. As fig- 
ure 3 shows, those ratios had a distinct bimodal distribution, 
so most products exited on a high note (internal selection) or 
were driven from the market due to low and sharply dropping 
sales (partial external selection). If we had modeled that ratio 
as a continuous outcome, it would have produced biased, 
inefficient, and inconsistent estimates due to non-normality, a 
truncated range between 0 and 1, and the fact that most 
observations were outliers, not centrally distributed out- 
comes (Greene, 1993). Instead, we treated the U-shaped dis- 
tribution in figure 3 as two collections of separate events, 
internal and partial external selection. 
We coded a partial external selection event in year t if the 
firm survived but the annual sales of the focal product were 
zero in year t+1, and that product's sales in year t had 
declined at least 50 percent from their rolling historical peak. 
For example, if a product lived for three years and had annual 
sales of $60, $100, and $10, then its sales peak was $100, 
and the threshold for a 50-percent drop was $50, which it fell 
below in its final year, indicating that it was selected out of 
the market by the external environment. In comparison, we 
designated an internal selection event in year t if a product's 
sales were zero in t+l1, the firm survived, and the product's 
sales had not declined by at least 50 percent from their 
peak.' For example, in a surviving firm, a product that lived 
for three years with annual sales of $60, $100, and $120 
would be coded as having an internal selection event, 
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To assess whether our results were sen- 
sitive to the choice of a 50-percent sales 
drop threshold, we reran our models 
using thresholds of 90 percent, 70 per- 
cent, and 30 percent. All results were 
unchanged, because few events changed 
type when we moved the dividing line, a 
result of the sharp bimodal distribution in 
figure 3. As an example, most internal 
events occurred at their product's histori- 
cal sales peak, so they would have been 
designated as internal regardless of 
whether we used a 1-percent, 50-per- 
cent, or 99-percent threshold. 
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because it would likely have continued to sell, but its man- 
agers chose to redirect its resources. Like the latter time 
series, a large majority of internal selection events (72 per- 
cent) occurred at the product's historical sales peak, so man- 
agers frequently killed products that the market judged 
viable. Overall, there were 2,206 internal selection events 
and 1,004 instances of partial external selection.2 
Product introductions. The number of new product introduc- 
tions was the dependent variable in testing hypotheses 5a 
and 5b, so we obtained that count for each firm in each year 
using the product introduction dates in the IDC data. We also 
included the one-year lag of that count to help control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms (see below for other 
steps). 
Independent Variables 
The cumulative number of selection events across a firm's 
life taps its potential for selection-based learning. Events that 
are more distant in time often have less influence than more 
recent ones due to organizational forgetting and because 
environmental change renders older lessons obsolete, so we 
used a formula that discounts cumulative experience (Darr, 
Argote, and Epple, 1995; Ingram and Baum, 1997; Baum and 
Ingram, 1998). For internal selection: 
Cumulative internal selection , = 
log + ( internal selectionsi * (discountT+1-J))j 
where T is the age of the ith firm in year t-1, selections1j is 
the number of products that were internally selected out of 
the ith firm's portfolio in the jth year of its life, and discount is 
a weight that depreciates the value of selection events 
across time. This measure was lagged by a year so that it 
was not confounded with selection events at time t. Some 
firms had no selection events for their first few years, so the 
quantity 1 was added to the event summation before logging 
it. We coded a similar measure for cumulative partial external 
selection t. 
Following the authors cited above, we selected a discount 
weight by comparing models with values of 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 
0.9, and 1.0, the latter indicating no discounting. In the selec- 
tion models, goodness of fit was best using a value of 0.9, 
and those results are reported below. Results were 
unchanged using discounts of 0.7 and 1.0. The product intro- 
duction models are reported using a weight of 0.3, which 
provided the best fit. Those results were unchanged with 
weights of 0.1 and 0.5. 
Hypotheses 5c and 5d predicted that prior product introduc- 
tions would affect future external selection rates, so we 
included product introductions,t1 in the selection models. 
Controls 
Organizational controls. We controlled for several firm-level 
factors using measures lagged by one year. Numerous stud- 
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We could not observe a sales decline in 
products that survived only one year, so 
we calculated the average first-year sales 
of all new products introduced in the 
same year and then coded an internal 
event if a product survived one year and 
exceeded that average. If its sales were 
below average, we coded a partial exter- 
nal selection event. As noted earlier, inter- 
nal and partial external selection occur 
only in surviving firms. Some studies 
have treated acquisitions as external 
selection events (i.e., failures), but 
takeovers were rare in this population, 
and when they occurred, firms' opera- 
tions were not combined (Ingram, 1993). 
For example, when AT&T acquired NCR 
in 1991, their operations remained sepa- 
rate. Thus, we treated the eight cases in 
which acquisitions took place as the 
ongoing operation of distinct entities. 
Dropping the post-acquisition bserva- 
tions did not change the results. 
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ies have shown that organizational failure rates vary with age 
(Baum, 1996), so we controlled for firm age (and its square, if 
significant) by measuring the years that a firm had participat- 
ed in the PC industry. Larger firms often have lower failure 
rates (Hannan and Freeman, 1989), so we controlled for firm 
size by calculating the natural logarithm of firm sales in year 
t-1, a measure that points to the scale of a firm's operations 
and the slack at its disposal (Henderson, 1999). Haveman 
(1993) found a curvilinear relationship between size and rates 
of change, so we included the square of size when it was 
significant. 
Some personal computer firms altered their organizational 
cores by changing technology strategies (Henderson, 1999). 
That can affect failure rates (Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 
1993), and it may also coincide with increased rates of inter- 
nal selection. In this industry, firms employed one of two 
technology strategies. Proprietary strategists developed their 
key technologies internally and emphasized performance and 
specialized features, while standards-based strategists used 
technologies that conformed with publicly available specifica- 
tions and emphasized efficiency and time-to-market with new 
components developed by external suppliers (Henderson, 
1999). Apple is an example of a proprietary strategist; Com- 
paq and Gateway are standards-based. 
To model strategy changes, which about 12 percent of the 
firms undertook, we followed Henderson's (1999) coding 
scheme, which draws on the fact that very few firms, other 
than strategy changers, offered a mix of proprietary and stan- 
dards-based products. Products were deemed standards- 
based if they conformed with one of the industry's three pub- 
licly available specifications, which involved products with 
microprocessors that were Zilog Z80-compatible, Intel x86- 
compatible, or Sparc-compatible. All other personal comput- 
ers were designated proprietary. Next, we determined if a 
firm derived over 50 percent of its annual sales from propri- 
etary or standards-based products, and then changed strate- 
gy was coded 1 beginning in the year that a firm's sales 
switched to or from a proprietary majority. Once set at 1, it 
retained that value, and it was coded 0 otherwise. To assess 
the dynamics of change, change clock (Amburgey, Kelly, and 
Barnett, 1993) was initially set to 0, and in firms that 
switched strategies, it recorded the elapsed years since the 
change.3 
Prospect theory suggests that firms whose performance is 
below their aspiration level are risk seeking, while those who 
exceed their aspirations are risk avoiding (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). This may affect whether firms try to change 
through internal selection or fail altogether after gambling on 
long shots. This can be modeled using a spline function in 
which separate variables are coded for performance above 
and below a historical or socially based target (Greve, 1998). 
With historical aspirations, a firm compares its recent perfor- 
mance to its earlier ones. With social aspirations, a firm com- 
pares its recent performance to the average of other firms in 
the same industry. Here, social and historical aspiration mea- 
sures were highly correlated (r > .84 for the below-aspiration 
spline; r > .98 for the above-aspiration spline) and yielded the 
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In analyses not reported here, the latter 
two variables were interacted with firm 
age, firm size, and a firm's founding tech- 
nology strategy. None of those interac- 
tions was significant, and the other 
results were unchanged. Overall, this 
meets recent recommendations for mod- 
eling the process and content effects of 
organizational change (Barnett and Carroll, 
1995; Baum, 1996). 
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same results. Social measures are reported below and 
equaled the fractional change in sales between t and t-1 for 
the focal firm minus the corresponding value for the entire 
industry excluding the focal firm. Prior performance < aspira- 
tions equaled the absolute value of that difference when it 
was negative and 0 otherwise. Prior performance > aspira- 
tions equaled that difference when it was positive and 0 
otherwise. 
We controlled for the number of products in a firm's portfolio, 
which can affect future viability by providing a firm with mar- 
ket data and feedback (Sorenson, 2000). Larger portfolios 
may also be associated with greater operating complexity 
since there are more potential interdependencies to consider 
(Thompson, 1967). If that slows a firm's responsiveness to 
external developments, external selection rates would rise. In 
the IDC data, each firm designated its own product distinc- 
tions. Some companies, such as Acer, often had small tech- 
nological differences among products (e.g., an 8 MHz vs. 
12 MHz processor), while others, such as IBM, typically had 
larger ones (e.g., different system architectures). Importantly, 
those differences were quite consistent within firms across 
time, so the fixed-effects models that we describe below 
controlled for such heterogeneity. 
We also suspected that firms with very few products might 
be unlikely to internally select them because that would 
amount to exiting the business unless they introduced a 
replacement. Similarly, firms might hang on and resist exter- 
nal selection even in the face of extremely poor performance 
if it meant abandoning the business altogether. To control for 
this, we set the models = 1 or 2 dummy to a value of 1 if a 
firm had only one or two products in its portfolio. That vari- 
able was coded 0 otherwise. 
Product-level controls. The environment tends to select out 
products with older technologies (Greenstein and Wade, 
1998), so we controlled for product age, measured in years. 
That count began at 1 in the year that a product was offered 
for sale, as listed in the IDC data. We also controlled for prod- 
uct age2 when it was significant. Managers may be hesitant 
to remove offerings that have previously accounted for sub- 
stantial revenues, so we controlled for product size, mea- 
sured by the natural logarithm of the focal product's sales in 
year t-1. That variable was set to zero in a product's first year. 
Population and community-level controls. Population den- 
sity may affect selection rates (Hannan and Carroll, 1992), so 
it was measured by counting the number of firms with non- 
zero personal computer sales in each year. Its square was 
not significant. To further control for density-driven competi- 
tion and legitimation, we measured product density/l00 by 
counting the number of products in the industry with non- 
zero sales in each year, then dividing by 100. Its square was 
not significant. Tacit collusion among an industry's largest 
firms can also affect competition (Bain, 1951), so we calculat- 
ed the four-firm concentration ratio, reported below as the C4 
ratio, by adding the market shares of the four firms with the 
highest sales in each year. 
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Social contagion, imitation, and vicarious learning may prompt 
firms to introduce new products or select out old ones in 
response to similar moves by others (Davis, 1991; Levitt and 
March, 1988; Rogers, 1995). In the introduction analyses, we 
therefore controlled for introduction mass, which equaled the 
log of the count of new product introductions by all other 
firms in the prior year (cf. Barnett and Amburgey, 1990; 
Baum and Mezias, 1992). Similarly, we controlled for selec- 
tion mass/00 in the selection models, which equaled the 
sum divided by 100 of the internal, partial external, and full 
external selection events across the industry in the prior year, 
excluding those in the focal firm. We aggregated those three 
event types into a single count because they were highly cor- 
related within years at the industry-level (r > .88). Results 
were unchanged using separate counts of prior event types. 
Selection mass and introduction mass were highly correlated 
(r = .92), so only the former appeared in the selection mod- 
els, and only the latter appeared in the product introduction 
models. 
Firms using similar technologies often form communities 
whose members compete with one another while also shar- 
ing infrastructure and legitimacy (Baum and Mezias, 1992; 
Wade, 1995). Following Wade (1996) and Henderson (1999), 
we classified community membership by the family of micro- 
processor used in a product because that substantially 
affects a personal computer's design and system architec- 
ture. Members of a microprocessor family have considerable 
compatibility in their hardware and assembly language soft- 
ware, so, for example, microprocessors in Motorola's 68000 
line (the 6802, 6808, 6809, 68000, 68010, 68020, 68030, and 
68040) formed one family, and personal computers that used 
any of those processors made up the 68000 community. 
Using the families listed in Wade (1996) and Henderson 
(1999), we identified 74 technical communities in this indus- 
try for the period 1975-1992, and then we identified 33 more 
that emerged during 1993 and 1994, years that extend 
beyond the time frame of those earlier studies (the list of 33 
is available from the authors by request). We then coded sev- 
eral variables. A community's age may affect its legitimacy 
and the datedness of its technology (Stinchcombe, 1965), so 
we measured community age in years. The number of firms 
in a community may affect the level of competition and legiti- 
mation within it (Baum and Oliver, 1992), so we controlled for 
community density. To capture system-level economies of 
scale, we measured community size by logging the total 
annual sales of each community. Such economies might 
exist here because personal computers exhibit network 
externalities in which users benefit to the degree that other 
users adopt compatible technology (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). 
Modeling and Estimation 
Internal, partial external, and full external selection are mutu- 
ally exclusive events that all products are at risk of, so we 
estimated their rates using event history analyses for com- 
peting events (Allison, 1995). Such models estimate a sepa- 
rate hazard rate for each event type, hj,k (t), the likelihood that 
the jth product will have a selection event of type k at time t. 
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Here, k equaled 1 for internal selection, 2 for partial external 
selection, and 3 for full external selection. 
Though a product could experience one event at most, firms 
with several products could experience multiple events, and 
standard errors would be biased toward zero unless unob- 
served differences across firms (e.g., culture) were account- 
ed for (Allison, 1995). Fixed-effects partial likelihood (FEPL) 
models do that by estimating hazard functions with the fol- 
lowing form: 
log hi,j,k (t) = (t) + Pk Xj(t) (1) 
Here, i indexes across firms; j indexes products; k indexes 
event types; a is vector of nuisance functions that account 
for unobserved heterogeneity across firms and allows them 
to vary by event type; P is a row vector of coefficient esti- 
mates that differs by event type; and X is a column vector of 
predictors that vary across products and time. Equation (1) 
yields event history models that account for both competing 
risks and repeated events (Allison, 1995). We implemented 
these models in SAS using PROC PHREG and its STRATA 
statement, which estimates partially parametric Cox models 
(Cox, 1972) with a fixed-effect for each organization in the a 
vector. While the a terms are latent, the hypotheses involve 
measured differences across firms and event types, which 
are captured in the 3 vectors. Since the data were recorded 
annually, there were numerous ties because one collection of 
events appeared to occur at exactly product age = 1, another 
at exactly product age = 2, and so on. We therefore used the 
EXACT option in PROC PHREG, which handles discrete data 
in which the year of each event is known but not its precise 
time. 
Our predictions involve evolutionary changes within firms due 
to organizational earning, not stable differences across them. 
Fixed-effects models are highly appropriate, then, because 
they eliminate time-invariant differences across subjects and 
focus solely on within-firm change (Greene, 1993). For exam- 
ple, firms may differ in terms of durable practices that affect 
how great a technological advance their new products typi- 
cally make. In a fast-paced world, products making bigger 
advances may survive longer before becoming obsolete, 
which could lower the rate of external selection. That, how- 
ever, involves stable differences across firms, so the oL terms 
in equation (1) fully absorb those effects. Similarly, firms may 
have stable but heterogeneous policies that affect how 
proactive their managers are in their internal selection deci- 
sions. Consistently proactive managers relying on forecasted 
demand might have high internal selection rates and pull 
products at the first hint of a downturn. Conversely, consis- 
tently reactive managers would leave products in the market 
until their sales had dropped, thus slowing internal selection. 
Again, the a terms in the FEPL Cox models fully account for 
such differences by allowing each firm to have its own base 
rate of each event type (Allison, 1995). 
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To buttress the product-level analyses of full external selec- 
tion, we used Cox models to assess organizational failure 
rates. Because failures are not repeated events, those mod- 
els did not contain fixed effects. 
To model new product introductions, we shifted from prod- 
uct-year to firm-year analyses. Ecologists make similar shifts 
as they go from failure analyses using firm-level data to esti- 
mates of founding rates using population-level data (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1989). Before a product is born, one cannot 
specify all the actors in the risk set because that includes all 
entrepreneurs inside and outside an industry with the poten- 
tial to create a product. One therefore assesses how organi- 
zational and industry conditions affect the number of intro- 
ductions in each firm-year. Those non-negative counts can be 
modeled by a Poisson process if one corrects for time-series 
correlations due to unmeasured heterogeneity in stable firm- 
level characteristics and overdispersion in which the vari- 
ances of event counts exceed their means (Hausman, Hall, 
and Griliches, 1984). Negative multinomial models do that by 
estimating overdispersion and using random effects to 
account for within-firm correlation (Guo, 1996). They assume, 
though, that the random effects are completely uncorrelated 
with the predictors, which is unlikely here, since the firms 
that frequently killed their own products probably had strong 
unmeasured abilities to introduce replacements. We there- 
fore used negative binomial models to account for overdis- 
persion, a first-order autoregressive process to account for 
temporal correlation, and robust variance estimates to further 
account for within-firm clustering (White, 1980; Carroll and 
Hannan, 2000). We implemented this in SAS using PROC 
GENMOD. 
Factors affecting product introductions may also affect failure 
rates, resulting in sample selection bias, so we used a two- 
step procedure in the introduction models (Heckman, 1979; 
Lee, 1983). We first estimated an event history model with 
an exponential distribution and lagged predictors to obtain 
F(i,t), the cumulative probability density function for the fail- 
ure of the ith firm at time t. Failures were coded as happen- 
ing halfway through year t (Petersen, 1991), and non-failing 
observations were right-censored. Next, we used the esti- 
mates of F(i,t) and Lee's formula to obtain sample selection 
Xi, the estimated likelihood that firm i would fail in year t, 
which was then controlled in the product introduction 
models. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics using product-year 
data. Those statistics were essentially unchanged using firm- 
year data, so they are not reported. With few exceptions, 
correlations involving the independent variables are modest. 
The largest is between the existing number of products and 
new product introductions (r = 0.78). To ensure that collineari- 
ty did not affect the results, we took two steps. First, we 
used matrix decomposition to calculate condition indices (Bel- 
sley, 1991), which showed that the only problematic overlap 
was between community size and the C4 ratio. The former 
was not significant, so it was dropped from the models that 
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Key Variables (N = 11,707 product-years) 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Internal selection 0.19 0.39 
2. Partial external selection 0.08 0.27 -.14 
3. Full external selection 0.11 0.32 -.17 -.11 
4. Cum. internal selection 0.70 0.78 .26 .11 -.13 
5. Cum. external selection 0.50 0.68 .22 .10 -.14 .76 
6. Product introductions 6.94 11.36 .23 .10 -.17 .62 .61 
7. Firm age 5.70 4.03 .10 .12 -.13 .57 .71 .49 
8. Firm size 9.99 2.57 .12 .13 -.26 .56 .60 .46 .66 
9. Changed strategy 0.21 0.41 .00 .06 -.07 .22 .29 .25 .43 .25 
10. Change clock 1.07 2.61 .01 .07 -.07 .31 .45 .45 .56 .45 .80 
11. Prior perf. < aspirations 0.22 0.33 -.08 -.04 .10 -.19 -.12 -.18 -.15 -.18 .00 -.02 
12. Prior perf. > aspirations 0.31 0.52 .00 -.02 -.02 -.11 -.20 -.04 -.24 -.04 -.08 -.13 
13. No. of products 14.90 19.29 .22 .12 -.17 .65 .70 .78 .60 .55 .26 .51 
14. Models = 1 or 2 0.13 0.34 -.14 -.09 -.09 -.28 -.25 -.24 -.26 -.24 -.10 -.12 
15. Product age 2.31 1.50 -.11 .28 .11 -.21 -.16 -.21 .04 -.07 -.04 -.05 
16. Product group size 8.12 2.15 .02 .25 -.01 .17 .23 .15 .36 .15 .17 .18 
17. Population density 265.18 46.84 .01 .03 .03 .11 .10 .08 .12 .08 .04 .05 
18. Product density 1524 662.3 .25 .11 .05 .53 .50 .46 .39 .46 .03 .18 
19. C4 ratio 0.49 0.04 .00 -.02 -.01 -.08 -.08 -.07 -.08 -.07 .00 -.04 
20. Selection mass 442.22 343.87 .30 .09 .06 .60 .57 .55 .40 .28 .01 .18 
21. Introduction mass 6.01 0.79 .20 .09 .04 .45 .42 .40 .34 .26 .03 .14 
22. Community age 9.86 2.50 .24 .10 .06 .50 .45 .43 .37 .43 .05 .17 
23. Community density 212.22 87.13 .06 .03 .04 .15 -.10 .16 -.03 .16 .04 .09 
Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
12. Prior perf. > aspirations -.39 
13. No. of products -.19 -.11 
14. Models = 1 or 2 .26 -.04 -.27 
15. Product age .03 -.06 -.20 .14 
16. Product group size -.19 .07 .20 -.05 -.04 
17. Population density -.25 .03 .08 -.38 -.03 -.05 
18. Product density -.27 -.09 .47 -.41 -.11 -.06 .51 
19. C4 ratio .25 -.03 -.08 .24 .02 .02 -.56 -.41 
20. Selection mass -.19 -.09 .54 -.30 -.13 -.12 .20 .87 -.19 
21. Introduction mass -.28 -.05 .41 -.45 -.09 -.11 .73 .92 -.43 .75 
22. Community age -.19 -.11 .43 -.35 -.04 -.09 .39 .85 -.32 .77 .79 
23. Community density -.21 .05 .14 -.33 -.11 -.19 .67 .51 -.53 .26 .60 .45 
follow. Second, collinearity's greatest threat in terms of Type 
I errors is that small changes in the data may create large 
changes in the parameter estimates (Belsley, 1991), so we 
randomly excluded 10 percent of the observations and reran 
each model, then repeated that process multiple times. All 
results were robust, which further indicates that collinearity 
was not an issue. 
Internal selection results. Table 2 reports results of the 
FEPL Cox models used to estimate internal selection rates. 
Model 1 contains the controls, and model 2 adds the inde- 
pendent variables. Hypothesis 4a predicted that the cumula- 
tive number of internal selection events in a firm's past 
would decrease its future internal selection rates. Model 2 
supports that, suggesting that repeated instances of internal 
selection empower a dominant political coalition within a firm 
that then becomes reluctant to terminate the products and 
technologies upon which its influence is based. In compari- 
son, cumulative partial selection increased future rates of 
internal selection, which supports hypothesis 4b. Managers 
therefore learned from the negative surprises of partial exter- 
nal selection and became more proactive, removing products 
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Table 2 
Fixed-effects Partial Likelihood Cox Models of Internal Selection Rates* 
Predictor variable Model (1) Model (2) 
Cumulative internal selection -1.105*" 
(0.074) 
Cumulative partial external selection 0.358" 
(0.089) 
Product introductions -0.033" 0.004 
(0.055) (0.012) 
Firm age 0.191 0.549*" 
(0.121) (0.132) 
Firm age2 0.001 -0.010" (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm size 0.526" 0.608" 
(0.169) (0.188) 
Firm size2 -0.024" -0.0230 
(0.009) (0.010) 
Changed strategy 0.219 0.618" 
(0.217) (0.223) 
Change clock -0.093" -0.154" 
(0.034) (0.038) 
Prior performance < aspirations 0.230 0.087 
(0.120) (0.128) 
Prior performance > aspirations 0.030 -0.089 
(0.065) (0.069) 
Number of products 0.040" 0.048*" 
(0.007) (0.008) 
Products = 1 or 2 -1.170"* -0.843*" 
(0.171) (0.176) 
Product age -0.134" -0.158" 
(0.027) (0.028) 
Product group size 0.056m 0.056*" 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Population density -0.004 -0.006" 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Product density /100 -0.009 -0.042 
(0.041) (0.044) 
C4 ratio 1.857 2.313* 
(1.123) (1.148) 
Selection mass /100 0.027 0.0900" 
(0.025) (0.027) 
Community age 0.023 0.002 
(0.052) (0.056) 
Community density -0.005*" -0.005" 
(0.001) (0.002) 
-2 * Log-likelihood 7828.337 " 7361.248" 
A Fit from prior model (X2) n.a. 467.089" 
0 p < .05; " p < .01; ' p < .001; two tailed tests. 
* N = 11,707 product-years with 2,206 internal selection events. 
from the market before the environment rendered them 
obsolete. 
External selection results. Tables 3 and 4 report the FEPL 
Cox models used to estimate partial external selection (mod- 
els 3 and 4) and full external selection (models 5-8). Models 
3 and 5 contain the controls, and models 4 and 7 add the 
independent variables. Model 6, as explained below, helped 
to determine if product launches partially mediated the 
effects of prior selection. Model 8 replicates model 7 but 
analyzes firm-level failure. 
Hypotheses la and 1b predicted that cumulative internal 
selection would decrease future rates of partial and full exter- 
nal selection. As models 4 and 7 show, hypothesis 1b is sup- 
ported, but hypothesis la is not. Internal selection therefore 
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Table 3 
Fixed-effects Partial Likelihood Cox Models of Partial External Selection 
Rates* 
Predictor variable Model (3) Model (4) 
03: Cumulative internal selection 0.106 (0.138) 
y: Cumulative partial external selection -1.530" (0.154) 
Product introductions -0.001 -0.067" 
(0.019) (0.022) 
Firm age -0.375* -0.3830 (0.146) (0.152) 
Firm size 0.1360 0.066 
(0.055) (0.068) 
Changed strategy 0.072 0.379 (0.298) (0.329) 
Change clock -0.015 0.062 (0.048) (0.057) 
Prior performance < aspirations 0.158 0.475" (0.141) (0.158) 
Prior performance > aspirations 0.007 -0.057 (0.090) (0.099) 
Number of products 0.030" 0.079"* (0.011) (0.013) 
Products = 1 or 2 -0.698" -0.088 
(0.184) (0.199) 
Product age 1.938" 1.922*" (0.117) (0.122) 
Product age2 -0.148" -0.152*" (0.013) (0.014) 
Product group size 0.074" 0.081" (0.019) (0.020) 
Population density 0.006* 0.0070 (0.003) (0.003) 
Product density /100 0.169" 0.298" (0.050) (0.056) 
C4 ratio -2.461 -2.314 
(1.444) (1.559) 
Selection mass / 10 0.050 0.102* 
(0.039) (0.042) 
Community age 0.149* 0.071 (0.066) (0.072) 
Community density -0.004* -0.005m (0.002) (0.002) 
-2 * Log-likelihood 4339.174" 3927.173' 
A Fit from prior model (X2) n.a. 412.001 
p < .05; " p < .01; p < .001; two tailed tests. 
* N = 11,707 product-years with 1,004 partial external selection events. 
Hypothesis 3b predicted IyI > IP31. 
kept obsolete deadwood from forming, which enhanced 
organizational survival, yet it did not affect the viability of the 
individual building blocks in a firm's product portfolio. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b stated that the cumulative number of 
partial external selection events would decrease a firm's 
future rates of partial and full external selection. Each of 
those predictions is supported, suggesting that partial selec- 
tion shook managers out of their complacency and attuned 
them to environmental changes that would have otherwise 
threatened their products with obsolescence and their organi- 
zations with failure. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b compared the strengths of internal 
and partial external selection as engines of adaptive learning. 
As H3a predicted, a post-hoc analysis of model 7 showed 
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Table 4 
Product-level and Firm-level Cox Models of Full External Selection* 
Firm-level 
Failure 
Product-level Models Model 
Predictor variable (5) (6) (7) (8) 
p: Cumulative internal selection 
-1.089'" -0.969" (0.233) (0.213) 
y: Cumulative partial external selection -2.234" -3.711*" 
(0.206) (0.300) 
Product introductions -0.141 -0.059" -0.246"* 
(0.047) (0.022) (0.055) 
Firm age 1.042" 1.006" 1.396" 1.0050" 
(0.198) (0.201) (0.214) (0.275) 
Firm age2 -0.084" -0.080" -0.0960" -0.051" 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
Firm size 0.678" 0.668" 1.0740"m 0.183' 
(0.237) (0.236) (0.263) (0.096) 
Firm size2 -0.0290 
-0.029? -0.0510" (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
Changed strategy 0.216 0.208 0.498 0.715 
(0.304) (0.304) (0.328) (0.445) 
Change clock -0.052 -0.052 0.014 -0.061 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.055) (0.095) 
Prior performance < aspirations 0.136 0.130 0.495" 0.466* 
(0.142) (0.142) (0.158) (0.228) 
Prior performance > aspirations 0.020 0.046 -0.066 -0.135 
(0.090) (0.089) (0.098) (0.158) 
Number of products 0.132" 0.207" 0.2970" 0.2930" 
(0.030) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) 
Products = 1 or 2 -0.746*" -0.744* -0.174 -0.384 
(0.187) (0.187) (0.198) (0.277) 
Product age (or portfolio age) 0.778" 0.734 0"- 0.7000" 0.306" 
(0.102) (0.103) (0.105) (0.096) 
Product age2 -0.044" -0.040" -0.038m" 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Product group size 0.074m" 0.079m" 0.077m" 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Population density 0.020"m 0.019"m 0.017" 0.0100 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Product density / 100 0.158" 0.154" 0.246m" 0.277" 
(0.049) (0.050) (0.054) (0.088) 
C4 ratio -2.662 -2.552 -2.755 -0.342 
(1.519) (1.522) (1.589) (2.023) 
Selection mass/100 0.825" 0.793" 0.908" 0.487"0 
(0.079) (0.079) (0.086) (0.096) 
Community age 0.1410 0.145* 0.070 0.151 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.071) (0.099) 
Community density -0.005" -0.004 -0.006" -0.0050 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
-2 * log likelihood 4306.763" 4294.212m 968.822" 677.915"0 
A fit from prior model (X2) n.a. 12.551 325.390" n.a. 
p < .05; " p < .01; " p < .001; two tailed tests. 
* Models 5-7 are fixed-effects partial ikelihood analyses with N = 11,707 product-years and 1,289 full external selec- 
tion events. Model 8 assesses organizational failure, and N = 2,709 firm-years with 576 failure events. Hypothesis 3a 
predicted lyI > 1131. 
that the magnitude of its coefficient for cumulative partial 
selection (y) was significantly greater than the one for inter- 
nal selection (1) (X2 = 15.97, 1 d.f., p < .001). A similar post- 
hoc analysis of model 4 supported hypothesis 3b, since the 
magnitude of its partial external selection coefficient (y) was 
significantly greater than the one for internal selection (1) (X2 
= 56.95, 1 d.f., p < .001). This indicates that partial selection, 
which highlights mismatches between managerial beliefs and 
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market demands, was a more powerful engine of adaptive 
learning than internal selection, whose potential lessons are 
sometimes distorted by organizational politics. 
Hypothesis 6a stated that new product introductions would 
decrease future rates of full external selection, and model 7 
supports that. Hypothesis 6b predicted that new product 
introductions would partially mediate the relationship 
between prior selection and future rates of full external selec- 
tion. If partial mediation exists, then (1) new product introduc- 
tions should be significant in model 6, and (2) the cumulative 
counts of internal and partial external selection should be sig- 
nificant in model 7, and (3) the coefficient for new products 
that is significant in model 6 should be smaller or non-signifi- 
cant in model 7 (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Here, we find 
strong evidence of partial mediation. While the new product 
term remained significant, its p-value more than doubles 
between models 6 and 7 (p < .0025 to p < .0059), and more 
importantly, its magnitude decreases by over 58 percent 
(-0.141 to -0.059). That supports H6b's prediction of partial 
mediation by indicating that selection catalyzes new product 
development. 
While the foregoing analyses consider product-level out- 
comes, model 8 reexamines full external selection but esti- 
mates organizational failure rates. Accordingly, it uses firm- 
year data, drops the measure of product size (firm size is still 
controlled), and drops product age, controlling instead for the 
average age of the products in a firm's portfolio. Because the 
squares of firm size and portfolio age were not significant, 
they are excluded from model 8. As table 4 shows, the 
cumulative numbers of internal and partial external selection 
events decrease the odds of organizational failure, as do 
greater numbers of new product introductions, supporting 
hypotheses 1 b, 2b, and 6a. Managers therefore learned to 
trim their product portfolios and increasingly used partial 
external selection to understand mismatches between their 
existing technologies and market demands. In turn, those 
lessons guided their search for new products, whose intro- 
duction enhanced firm survival. Also, as H3a predicted, a 
post-hoc analysis showed that the magnitude of the partial 
selection coefficient (y) was greater than the one for internal 
selection (3) (X2 = 66.525, 1 d.f., p < .001), so partial selec- 
tion was a more powerful engine of adaptive learning than 
internal selection. On the whole, model 8 reveals that results 
are the same regardless of whether full external selection is 
modeled as the death of an entire firm or the multiple deaths 
of each of its products. 
Product introduction results. Models 9 and 10 in table 5 
analyze new product launches. Model 10 shows that those 
introductions increased with the cumulative numbers of inter- 
nal and partial external selection events in a firm's past, 
which supports hypotheses 5a and 5b. Firms therefore 
learned from non-fatal selection events and used that knowl- 
edge to generate greater numbers of technological variations, 
which as shown earlier, enhanced firm survival. 
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Table 5 
Autocorrelative Negative Binomial Models of New Product Introduction 
Counts (N = 2,709 firm-years) 
Predictor variable Model (9) Model (10) 
Cumulative internal selection 0.635' 
(0.111) 
Cumulative partial external selection 0.517" 
(0.140) 
Product introductions (lagged) 0.005 -0.012 
(0.016) (0.015) 
Firm age -0.020 -0.026 
(0.014) (0.014) 
Firm size 0.066" 0.067" 
(0.019) (0.017) 
Changed strategy -0.2370 -0.389" 
(0.107) (0.126) 
Change clock 0.055" 0.079" 
(0.021) (0.028) 
Prior performance < aspirations 0.229" 0.216" 
(0.078) (0.075) 
Prior performance > aspirations -0.005 -0.003 
(0.041) (0.041) 
Number of products 0.030" 0.002 
(0.010) (0.008) 
Products = 1 or 2 -1.4920" -1.5200" 
(0.077) (0.074) 
Population density -0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Product density / 100 0.0300 0.010 
(0.010) (0.010) 
C4 ratio -0.091 -0.679 
(0.642) (0.642) 
Introduction mass 0.060 0.090 
(0.112) (0.128) 
Community age 0.030 0.0370 
(0.019) (0.019) 
Community density 0.001 * 0.001" (0.000) (0.000) 
Sample selection X -3.264" -3.528" 
(0.334) (0.297) 
Dispersion parameter 0.366 0.344 
(0.034) (0.033) 
Deviance 2323.710* 2287.170' 
A fit from prior model (X2) n.a. 36.540" 
0 p < .05; " p < .01; ' p < .001; two tailed tests. 
DISCUSSION 
Though earlier work has explored links between population- 
level change and wholesale alterations in an organization's 
core (e.g., Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993; Levinthal, 
1997; Greve, 1998), full external selection has been studied 
in isolation from internal selection, which involves manageri- 
ally driven changes in the variety of a firm's products and 
technologies. In this study, we considered both internal and 
full external selection, introduced partial external selection as 
a third variety, and showed that the three arise from interde- 
pendent and coevolving processes. Coevolution occurred 
because internal selection events had a negative and cumula- 
tive effect on future rates of full external selection, which 
occurs when the environment kills an entire organization and 
each of the products in its portfolio. Conversely, partial exter- 
nal selection, which occurs when the environment kills some 
of a firm's products, had a positive and cumulative effect on 
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future rates of internal selection. One process that linked the 
internal and external realms was new product development. 
Internal and partial external selection each catalyzed the cre- 
ation of new products, and firms that introduced more tech- 
nological variations decreased their future odds of full exter- 
nal selection and organizational failure. 
When the environment selects out part of a firm, managers 
respond by eliminating additional pieces of their product port- 
folio and developing new variants to replace them, actions 
that affect the future odds of both product-level and firm- 
level survival. Partial external selection is therefore part of a 
coevolutionary loop, since it begets internal selection and 
technological variation, which shape the future chances that 
the environment will kill all or part of a firm. Another form of 
coevolution occurred because managers frequently killed 
products before they became obsolete. Those proactive 
moves prevented deadwood from forming and allowed man- 
agers to reshuffle resources, which enabled firms to adapt to 
changing external conditions. This is evidenced by (1) the 
positive and cumulative effect of internal selection events on 
new product development and (2) the negative effect of new 
product introductions on organizational failure and full exter- 
nal selection. While we doubt that managers can accurately 
forecast technological discontinuities, there is strong evi- 
dence that they often extrapolate from their experience to 
adapt in anticipation of fast-breaking future changes. Though 
managerial foresight does not figure in external selection the- 
ory, our findings square with the fact that forecasting, 
whether it involves designing new products, ordering next 
season's inventory, setting budgets, or giving financial guid- 
ance to investors, is a frequent occurrence in many firms, 
and as our findings indicate, one that is amenable to learning 
by doing. 
On the whole, synthesizing theories of internal and external 
selection is vital. This study has taken a first step by propos- 
ing that firms in high-velocity settings can be viewed as 
loosely coupled collections of products, each embodying vari- 
ants of a firm's core technologies. Since either the environ- 
ment or a company's managers can select out a product 
without killing the entire organization, a firm's technological 
core is better viewed as multipart and modular rather than as 
the monolithic and indivisible whole discussed by external 
selectionists (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). By emphasizing the ways in which an orga- 
nization functions as a single, integrated unit, external selec- 
tion theory has limited its focus to the deaths of entire firms 
and equated external selection with the inability to adapt to 
changing circumstances (Schumpeter, 1942; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984, 1989). In comparison, by studying multiprod- 
uct firms, we were able to see adaptations that occurred 
after the death of some of their subparts, instances of partial 
external selection that prompted companies to search for 
new solutions and redirect their resources in ways that 
increased the odds of both product-level and firm-level sur- 
vival. In some multiproduct firms, a single team repeatedly 
develops new offerings, while in others, multiple teams oper- 
ate in parallel and are organized into separate divisions. In the 
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former type of firm, internal and partial external selection 
remove a product but leave its supporting team intact. That 
also happens in multi-team companies, yet they can also 
shed an entire organizational subunit and survive. An interest- 
ing topic for future research, which our data did not allow us 
to address, is to explore how product removal and subunit 
removal differ as engines of organizational daptation. 
Our analyses revealed that partial external selection was a 
more powerful driver of evolutionary adaptation than prior 
instances of internal selection in terms of (1) reducing, by a 
greater margin, the future hazards of environmental selection 
and (2) increasing, by a greater amount, the rate at which 
firms proactively pruned their portfolios. The reason, we 
asserted, is that partial selection drove firms to find and 
understand mismatches between their current products and 
external demands, while internal selection decisions were 
increasingly colored by politics as the winners of earlier 
resource battles gradually skewed selection criteria way 
from market-driven realities toward the preservation of their 
political power. While we could not measure political power 
directly, our results showed that internal selection was self- 
braking, since its rate declined with the cumulative number 
of such events. This contrasts with other research showing 
that many organizational ctions build momentum and 
increase in frequency (Miller and Friesen, 1980; Amburgey, 
Kelly, and Barnett, 1993), especially actions proven to have 
value, because managers repeat what has worked in the past 
(Cyert and March, 1963). Here, internal selection was valu- 
able in enhancing survival, so the forces that slowed its repe- 
tition are likely to have been potent. Future research is need- 
ed to determine if politics were, in fact, what most 
constrained internal selection, yet that seems likely, given 
that the quest to attain, exercise, and preserve power per- 
vades both case descriptions in the internal selection stream 
(Bower, 1970) and general theories of external selection (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Miller, 1993). 
Hypothesis la, which predicted a negative and cumulative 
relationship between internal selection and future instances 
of partial external selection, was the only one not supported, 
possibly because internal selection gave rise to opposing 
forces. Our results strongly indicate that internal selection 
prevented deadwood from forming and allowed managers to 
reallocate resources to meet changing external demands. At 
the same time, the subgroups empowered by those realloca- 
tions may have also tried to entrench themselves by lobbying 
for incremental upgrades to existing products, rather than 
developing new ones, and suppressing novel ideas by inter- 
nal competitors in favor of approaches based on existing 
technologies (Serensen and Stuart, 2000). As a result, inter- 
nal selection may have produced enough incremental change 
and portfolio pruning to forestall organizational failure, which 
is consistent with our support for Hlb. Yet such changes 
were apparently not enough, as Hla predicted, to enhance 
the external viability of individual products. Internal selection 
therefore improved the viability of organizational wholes, but 
not the strength of their individual building blocks. To further 
assess this, future studies might examine how internal selec- 
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tion affects a firm's propensity to introduce incremental prod- 
ucts rather than more daring ones based on major technologi- 
cal advances. 
Along these lines, Sorensen and Stuart (2000) found that as 
firms age, they increasingly exploit their existing technolo- 
gies, as a firm's dominant political coalition has strong incen- 
tives to pursue activities that require its members' expertise. 
Our analysis of internal selection compliments those authors' 
work by indicating that coalitions maintain dominance not 
only through choices about specific technologies but also by 
choosing to retain or kill system-level products. Systems are 
composed of bundles of component technologies that must 
function together coherently, and the distinction between 
systems and components is important because firms make 
decisions about each using different routines, management 
structures, and ways of handling information (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990). Given that, future research might probe the 
interplay between component selection and system-level 
product selection. For example, as firms age, grow, and gain 
selection experience, does their attention shift from creating 
new systems using existing components to using new com- 
ponents to prolong the lives of old systems? Employing cut- 
ting-edge components often requires investments in propri- 
etary technologies (Henderson, 1999), so such choices are 
likely to create political battles for resources between system 
developers and component engineers that affect selection, 
innovation, and a firm's degree of vertical integration. 
Like all studies, this one has limitations that suggest areas 
for future investigation. Aside from the small number of inter- 
views we conducted, we did not have access to managers' 
decision making, so we had to assess each product's sales 
trajectory to distinguish between internal and partial external 
selection. Future research that tests our assumptions about 
when managers cancel products is therefore needed. Also, 
the fast pace and short product life cycles of the personal 
computer industry may have produced effects that do not 
generalize to slower settings. In more placid settings, such 
as branded foods or hotel lodging, in which products have 
long lives and technology changes little, selection-based 
learning is apt to play a less prominent role. Partial external 
selection may provoke threat rigidity rather than adaptive 
search in more placid settings in which managers expect 
products to live for decades rather than months, so research 
in other industries is needed. 
While our data provided an excellent picture of the products 
that firms brought to market, they did not contain information 
about projects that companies initiated but abandoned before 
commercializing. In this industry, that posed little threat 
because development times were short, so most projects 
that were begun were probably completed. Yet in other set- 
tings, such as the pharmaceutical industry, in which product 
development times often exceed a decade and numerous 
variations are abandoned during clinical trials, greater atten- 
tion to pre-commercial selection would be needed. In addi- 
tion, decentralized firms in which products are backed by rel- 
atively autonomous teams are the norm in high-velocity 
industries, but functional structures and centralized decision 
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making are common in more stable settings, so research in 
those contexts is required. Finally, product introductions were 
the only form of organizational search that we studied. Prod- 
uct development may often be incremental and adaptive, 
while more discontinuous changes, such as replacing a 
founder (Carroll, 1984), might not be. Research into other 
forms of post-selection search is therefore warranted. 
In conclusion, our findings support our claim that internal and 
external selection are interwoven processes and not the dis- 
joint phenomena that their separate theories, methods, and 
literatures would indicate. Future synthesis of those research 
streams is necessary and is likely to yield important 
advances. In thinking about how firms and the individual pro- 
jects within them coevolve, we can begin to ask questions 
such as what sequences of internal and external selection 
events are most and least adaptive? How do the effects of 
selection-based learning vary with industry volatility and 
velocity? And what organizational structures and incentive 
schemes best enable selection-based learning? By address- 
ing these questions, we stand to gain a richer understanding 
of how processes of variation, selection, and retention shape 
both organizational nd industry evolution. 
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